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In this second part we will commit to briefly describing the development of the Arab-Israeli question in the second half of the twentieth century. After the clashes of 1948 and the Suez crisis, Israel further strengthened itself to the point of becoming a dominant regional power. This allowed it to re-project its offensive capability onto its neighbors repeatedly throughout the century. If you missed the first part, you can click here to read it.
Israel’s blietzkrieg: the Six-Day War
Eleven years after the Suez events, new winds of war were blowing in the Holy Land. The rise to power of the Ba’athist party in Syria in 1966 brought Damascus and Tel Aviv at loggerheads. Noureddin Mustafa Ali al-Atassi, the new Syrian leader, immediately sought support to oppose the Israeli threat. In fact, the two countries were starting an intense skirmish in the Sea of Galilee area.
Egypt immediately responded to the call, signing a mutual defense pact with Damascus. Israel moved very quickly, pre-emptively attacking various Jordanian villages where several Palestinian fedayeen took refuge and then asymmetrically installing Jewish forces. This attack exacerbated the situation even more, not allowing the tension to subside.
In April 1967, the escalation began with Israel’s shooting down of seven Syrian MiGs over the skies of Damascus. Meanwhile, a Soviet intelligence report incorrectly reported to the Syrian government that the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) was massing its troops in the Golan Heights. Having obtained this information in May, Nasser moved boldly into the Sinai calling for a partial withdrawal of UN troops in the area.
The organization offered two options to the Egyptian president: non-withdrawal or total withdrawal. In order not to lose credibility, Nasser chose complete withdrawal, effectively removing the only buffer between himself and Israel. On the 22nd of the same month he repeated the closure of the Straits of Tiran as eleven years before. The Israelis interpreted this as a casus belli, believing that exclusion from the Red Sea was unacceptable to them.
Meanwhile, on the 30th Jordan joined the Syrian-Egyptian defense pact to avoid diplomatic isolation. The United States gave tacit approval to Israel regarding a pre-emptive attack which took place on 5 June 1967. The great Arab military catastrophe began with a blow as rapid as it was lethal: the Israeli air force destroyed 585 coalition aircraft still on the ground in a few hours Islamic. This gave the Jews total control of the heavens, a mainstay of contemporary warfare.
The ground offensive was overwhelming and in six days Israel conquered the entire Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. The poor coordination of the Arab armies did not lead to a joint attack, allowing Israel to defeat one army at a time. From June 6 to 8, the Israelis overwhelmed the Egyptian army and blocked the retreat of thousands of soldiers in the Mitla and Gidi passes.
Thousands died, many were captured, others fled across the desert where they died of starvation. Furthermore, on June 8, the Jewish air force deliberately attacked the American spy ship USS Liberty, causing the death of 34 American sailors in the total carelessness of the naval group orbiting the Saratoga aircraft carrier. The action appears to have been carried out by virtue of communications recorded by the USS Liberty that the Israeli government did not want disclosed.
On 10th June a ceasefire was proclaimed which ended the hostilities. The Arab world was destroyed by this conflict, causing disappointments towards the elites in power and a sense of distrust of the pan-Arab ideology. The Jewish State had tripled its size in just six days, dealing a severe blow to its historic enemies. Israel had won strategically, but not all the gains would last long.
To make war to make diplomacy: the Yom Kippur War
The Six Day War had represented a watershed for the Islamic world. Israel was now at the peak of its strength, while the losing countries reorganized themselves from a political point of view. 1970 saw two major leadership changes in the two main nations of the pro-Palestinian bloc. Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt following the sudden death of Nasser who had suffered a heart attack.
Syria, instead, saw the rise to power of Baathist Hafez al-Assad (father of current Syrian president Bashar al-Assad). Jordan and Lebanon limited themselves to withdrawing from the conflict, although they continued to ideally support the Palestinian cause. President Sadat was immediately committed to giving Egypt a huge geopolitical change of direction.
He was willing to break the taboo of negotiations with Israel, as long as a compromise acceptable to both sides was reached. Sadat was aware that the Egyptian economy needed to be restored. For him, such an economic recovery could only happen by easing military spending and allowing Western investments to flock into the country. This, however, remained impossible as long as Israel retained control of the Sinai Peninsula and a peace treaty was reached.
Tel Aviv immediately rejected the Egyptian proposal which consisted of: opening the Suez Canal, declaring a ceasefire and negotiating a peace according to UN Resolution 242. According to Israel, the new borders were necessary for the security of the Jewish state. In light of this, Sadat decided to proceed by an unorthodox way: using the sword to make peace.
Egypt intended to start a new conflict with Israel to weaken it so that it could negotiate the terms of the negotiations as equals. Cairo once again resorted to its usual Syrian ally to organize a real coordinated attack this time. Al-Assad responded positively to the Egyptian plan and in January the two armies were placed under a unified command, while various diversionary maneuvers managed to conceal Arab intentions.
In fact, Israeli intelligence did not understand that the Arabs were about to mount a new military operation, grossly underestimating the war potential of Syria and Egypt following the defeat in 1967. Even the Jewish High Command was not far behind, too confident in his military superiority.
On October 6th 1973, the Yom Kippur War eventually broke out. The attack was a real bolt from the blue for the Israeli government which had to take action. The Arab operations were effective this time thanks to real joint coordination which allowed the Egyptians to cross the Suez Canal and the Syrians to move towards the Golan Heights.
The sudden involvement of the American Air Force in defense of Israel averted a harsh Jewish defeat. Following the partially effective Israeli counteroffensive, a ceasefire was negotiated on 22 October. Egypt had managed to bridge the disparity in strength on the field and could now negotiate on equal terms. Sinai was returned to its rightful owner and a long process was started that led to the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty between Egypt and Israel with the Camp David accords of 1979.
The unexpected ceasefire took the Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad by surprise who did not want to follow Sadat on the path of compromise, considering the Egyptian as a traitor to the Palestinian cause. The Syrian had never been informed of Cairo’s desire to negotiate quickly with Tel Aviv. This resulted in an inconclusive conflict for Damascus which was unable to regain possession of the Golan Heights taken from it in 1967. Despite this, Baathist Syria stoically persevered in its anti-Zionist hard line and arms race.
The Yom Kippur War was not only fundamental to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also to the balance of the Cold War. Egypt gradually abandoned the Soviet sphere and aligned itself with the United States in 1979. This upheaval weakened the Palestinian front, as Israel no longer had to worry about its southern borders. This began an institutionalization of the Israeli occupation and pushed the Palestinian resistance to resort to increasingly extreme and dire methods. The dynamics of the conflict were now even more complex.
For the first part, click here.
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