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The renewed clash between Israel and Palestine, as well as the confrontation between Iran and the Jewish state in recent days, has once again demonstrated the centrality of the Middle East for the geopolitical balance of the entire planet. For decades now, this area of the world has been subject to clashes, conflicts and foreign interventions aimed at establishing a much-desired supremacy over the region. Since 2011, Syria has represented a continuous battleground for the aspirations of Turkey, the USA, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and Salafist groups. In the end, it was Moscow that intervened directly in Syrian affairs, with the aim of preserving the state structure of Damascus and preventing the establishment of the nascent Islamic State.
A long-standing presence: the Soviet Union and the Middle East
Until the collapse of 1991, the Soviet Union had cultivated a prolific and multifaceted foreign policy towards the Middle East since the post-war period. Having been the first socialist state entity, Moscow had a strong influence on Middle Eastern countries that had just freed themselves from Western colonialism. The anti-colonial and emancipatory vocation of Soviet socialism partially inspired Michel Aflaq’s Ba’athist pan-Arabism.
In fact, Nasser, Gaddafi and Hafez al-Assad proceeded to pursue a highly statist economic and industrial development. The Kremlin busily promoted regional industrialization. He financed very important works such as Aswan’s High Dam and the Isfahan metallurgical complex. As of December 25th 1991, the Soviet Union had completed approximately 350 industrial projects throughout North Africa and the Middle East.
But not only industry and commerce; the USSR was also the military point of reference for many countries, including Syria. Military supplies to Damascus brought in as much as 11 billion USD to Soviet coffers in the mid-1980s. Moscow’s influence went beyond mere economic relations, by virtue of its strong influence on the local ruling classes who often headed to Russia to complete their studies.
In fact, a pro-Russian component was born within Syrian society, also in light of the formation of Syrian-Russian families. As if that wasn’t enough, this process of inveterate friendship was further sealed by the creation of Tartus naval base in 1971. This military complex is still today the main foothold of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea, fundamental for its force projection capabilities which Moscow has always pursued in this area.
The collapse of the Soviet state was therefore a real trauma for those Middle Eastern countries that persisted in not making compromises with the American-Zionist front. The newly formed Russian Federation led by Boris Yeltsin, in fact, had no intention of pursuing that distinctly third world foreign policy. In any case, this unnatural attitude would have been only a parenthesis.
From Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin
The end of the Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin‘s turbulent rise to power marked the beginning of a terrible decade for Russia. Corruption, poverty, bandit capitalism, terrorism and crime marked the Russian 1990s. Even from a geopolitical point of view the situation was not any better. Moscow found itself having to deal with an extremely limited force projection due to economic constraints and the loss of the former Soviet confederation republics.
Relations with the Middle East were practically severed, as evidenced by the paltry percentage of trade with Middle Eastern states (less than 1% of the entire budget in the mid-1990s). Syria was no exception, so much so that the naval base of Tartus itself was left almost in a state of abandonment. This inactivity was also driven by Yeltsin’s new strategic objective: the need to build a strategic partnership with the United States, recognizing its superiority in the geopolitical field.
Post-Soviet Russia intended to enter the consensus of Western nations, renouncing all third world policies of the 20th century. As proof of these intentions, in 1995 Russia and the United States secretly signed the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement. This represented a compromise between the two sides: the USA would refrain from providing military assistance to Eastern European and Middle Eastern states, while Russia would similarly refrain from arming Iran.
However, this disengagement would not last long. The advent of Putin in 2000 would have opened with a clear signal of rapprochement with former Middle Eastern allies and of renewed strategic independence which would have marked an ever-increasing tension between Moscow and the NATO bloc. Russia once again showed itself as an active player by establishing solid relations with the Arab League and becoming an observer in 2005 of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation by virtue of the Muslim peoples living in the Russian Federation (about 14% of the population).
Putin also moved from the point of view of soft power, taking care to once again spread the study of Russian culture. The Ruskij Mir organization, as well as the opening of a Middle Eastern section of Russia Today, still play an important role in defining the image that Russia wants of itself. Moscow also did its utmost to recover contacts with the Syria of Bashar al-Assad, son of deceased Hafez.
With the exception of the parenthesis of then Westernist Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012), Russia was once again carving out its own dimension in the Islamic world as an alternative pole. His action, however, was still seen as not very incisive. In particular, the Gulf States, occasionally hostile to Russian aims, saw in Moscow an interlocutor far from the decisiveness of the Soviet Union.
Russia was an extremely lively actor, but little capable of influencing world destinies. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 overthrow of Gaddafi were examples of this. This put Moscow faced with the need to increase its geopolitical weight. The Arab Spring and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war put the Kremlin with its back to the wall: see its influence disappear or react forcefully.
Neatening the chaos: the war in Syria
When Syria fell into civil war in 2011, many Western analysts argued that the Assad regime would not last long. This reading would have proven false due to the many factions and numerous external interferences. Syria soon transformed into an arena in which the most disparate international actors began to challenge each other more or less directly.
Moscow was immediately active in trying to find a mediation capable of preserving its strong influence on the country. In fact, the historic agreement with the Assad family and the presence of the aforementioned Tartus base obliged the Kremlin to act effectively so as to prevent other powers from filling the power vacuum caused by a possible fall of Damascus. Initially, Russia moved from a purely diplomatic point of view.
In addition to participating in the UN conferences in Geneva, the symbolically important yet factually inconclusive meetings in Moscow between the Syrian opposition and the legitimate government were organized between 2013 and 2015. The objective was to initiate a dialogue capable of finding a compromise between the two parties, so as to start a peace process. The opposition accepted by the Kremlin was only the secular one. Islamists and fundamentalists represented threats that had to be liquidated.
It is important to underline that the terrorist threat represented a vital domestic political issue for Russia. In fact, Moscow had faced Chechen terrorism in previous years. This had caused two direct wars with the Republic of Chechnya, as well as brutal attacks such as those in Beslan and Dubrovka. The surviving Chechen terrorists had found a new reason to exist in the conflict in Syria. Other foreign fighters from the Caucasus and Central Asia also soon joined the ranks of the Syrian Islamic fundamentalists.
However extensive the diplomatic efforts were, they had no real effect on the civil war, which was becoming increasingly brutal. The birth of ISIS did nothing but make the issue even more threatening to world balances. It was only the Kremlin’s firm opposition that averted a potential direct NATO intervention, the casus belli of which would have been the use of chemical weapons in August 2013 near Damascus. Bashar al-Assad was immediately blamed for the incident by the Western world, although no investigation had ever verified the truthfulness of these accusations.
Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition, as well as various Islamist groups, were strengthening thanks to the support of Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 2015 was a crucial year for the fate of Syria. The loyalist forces showed some first signs of weakening. Damascus lost the important city of Idlib to al-Nusra, as well as Palmyra to the brutal occupation of ISIS. The defeat of Assad would have meant for the Kremlin the loss of an important ally and the proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism in the world. The situation was such that it required drastic measures which were not long in coming. Russia revealed all its cards: the time had come for a military operation.
The Russian involvement
The military action was historic for two main reasons. For the first time since the fall of the USSR, Russia engaged in a conflict far from its borders.
Furthermore, the attack would have been characterized by air supremacy without the use of large Russian ground forces, along the lines of US doctrine. The Russian government thus obtained a concession for Khmeimim’s air base which was quickly renovated and expanded. From here the air forces could operate freely.
On September 30th 2015, the Russian Air Force launched a massive close air support campaign for government counteroffensives towards Idlib, Palmyra and Deiz ez-Zor. Thanks also to the precious military cooperation with Iran, this action proved fundamental in restoring impetus to the tried Syrian army. This show of force by Russia took the entire international community by surprise, which did not believe Russia was capable of projecting its force effectively so far from its epicenter.
This transformed the Kremlin into the number one interlocutor regarding the Syrian war. The various actors in the field had to gradually conform to Russian strategic objectives: create an international coalition against ISIS and accept Assad again into the global diplomatic forum. Mindful of the Afghan experience of a few decades earlier, Moscow announced in March 2016 a partial withdrawal of its armed forces in the conflict. The objective of tipping the balance again in favor of Damascus had been successfully achieved.
A stable ceasefire was reached in 2017, following the defeat of the Islamic State on the ground. From then on, the situation remained generally stationary. The Russian military intervention had certainly led to a stabilization of the conflict, but this is currently far from being resolved. The Syrian government controls the majority of the internationally recognized national territory, but many areas are still occupied by non-governmental forces. Former Al-Nusra is still entrenched in the Idlib region, supported by the Turkish army.
The Kurdish militias control the eastern part of the country, although signs of a possible reconciliation with Damascus have begun to emerge. The United States controls Al-Tanf base in the south, while Russia and Iran own dozens of bases throughout Syria. It will be essential to observe how and if Syria can return to being a united nation. In fact, the current status quo cannot be definitive and the danger of possible resurgences of the conflict remains. The 2015 intervention was in any case a geopolitical watershed. Russia had decisively reaffirmed its ability to assert its strategic interests.
Other events such as the occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflict in Donbass which expanded into a real conventional war in 2022 between Kiev and Moscow have decreed a clear change of direction. Russia is no longer the ruined Yeltsinian state ready to satisfy Washington’s diktats. It has regained its role as a hub in its own right, eager to affirm its strategic ambitions. History has officially started again in the Old Continent too. It will be up to all of us to be able to ride it or be overwhelmed by it.
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